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According to one influential line of thought only propositions can be part of one’s 
evidence, since only propositions can serve the central functions of our ordinary 
concept of evidence. Namely, only propositions can serve functions of inference to 
the best explanation, figuring in probabilistic confirmation and ruling out of 
hypotheses.1 Consider inferences to the best explanation. You cannot explain 
cucumber. You can explain why cucumbers have this or that particular feature, 
why they are green, why they are classified as accessory fruits, why you like/hate 
cucumbers, etc. A sentence of the form “Cucumber because ...” is ungrammatical. 
‘Because’ can grammatically conjoin only declarative sentences. Hence, the 
argument goes, only propositions can figure in inferences to the best explanation. 
Similar considerations apply to the probabilistic confirmation/reasoning and the 
ruling out of hypotheses. 
The central function argument for the propositionality of evidence has been 
recently criticized. One particularly puzzling challenge consists in questioning the 
assumed understanding of explanation, probabilistic reasoning and exclusion of 
hypotheses. The thought is that, contrary to what a proponent of the central 
function argument suggests, it need not be the case that only propositions can be 
the relata of inference to the best explanation, probabilistic reasoning, and the 
ruling out of hypotheses. This line of objection has been recently considered by 
Ram Neta.2 In what follows I reply to Neta's objection. 
 
 
                                                                
1 Cf. Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
194-200. 
2 In Ram Neta, “What Evidence Do You Have?” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 
(2008): 89–119. 
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With respect to the considerations about inferences to the best explanation 
Neta suggests more specifically: 
[E]ven if the conjunction ‘because’ can grammatically conjoin nothing other than 
declarative sentences, nothing about the relata of why-explanations follows from 
this feature of the conjunction. Might this not be a case in which grammar is 
metaphysically misleading? 3,4 
Neta seems to suggest in this passage that considerations about language use don’t 
entail one or another view about the relata of why-explanations. This much seems 
to be true, indeed. However, that facts about our language use don’t entail any 
particular view about why-explanations, doesn’t mean that they provide no 
support whatsoever for one or another view. Moreover, Neta’s own argumentative 
dialectic relies on the thought that facts about the way we speak might support a 
philosophical view about evidence. Neta proposes, for instance, various examples 
that, allegedly, support the view that non-propositional items can play a role in 
explanations and probabilistic reasoning. 
Neta claims that the ordinary talk of bloody knives as evidence, of clouds 
being evidence that it will rain and people “planting evidence” suggests that the 
grammar of ‘because,’ as it is assumed in the argument from the central functions 
of evidence is metaphysically misleading.5 That is, according to Neta, given the 
way we ordinarily talk about evidence (in particular by treating objects as 
evidence) we can infer that the relata of why-explanations need not be 
propositional. This line of thought doesn’t challenge the view that figuring in 
inferences to the best explanation is a central role of evidence. It accepts that it is a 
central role of evidence. Rather, the thought is that given facts about our ordinary 
language use (in particular the talk of bloody knives as evidence) and the fact that 
                                                                
3 Neta, “What Evidence Do You Have?” 96. 
4 Neta’s treatment of considerations from probabilistic reasoning and ruling out of hypotheses is 
similar to his treatment of considerations about inferences to the best explanation. See for 
instance: “Why should we accept the claim that, ‘when “probability” has to do with the 
evidential status of beliefs,’ then ‘what has a probability is a proposition’? Why not say instead 
that what has a probability is, at least in some cases, an event or a state rather than a 
proposition? What is the probability of the knife’s being (in the state of being) bloody, given 
that the defendant is guilty?” (Neta, “What Evidence Do You Have?” 97). And: “Let’s grant that 
only propositions can be inconsistent in the relevant sense. Why should we allow, though, that 
there is an inconsistency between hypothesis and evidence itself, rather than an inconsistency 
between hypothesis and one or another statement of the evidence?” (Neta, “What Evidence Do 
You Have?” 97). Hence, I propose to focus here on his reply to the considerations about 
inference to the best explanation. 
5 Cf. Neta, “What Evidence Do You Have?” 96. 
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figuring in inferences to the best explanation is a central role of the ordinary 
concept of evidence, one is not more warranted in concluding that only 
propositional items can serve central functions of evidence than one is warranted 
in concluding that non-propositional items can figure in inferences to the best 
explanation. 
Nevertheless, Neta acknowledges that a proponent of the central function 
argument for propositionality of evidence might tell a story about cases where one 
appeals to a bloody knife as evidence. Such a story would supposedly explain what 
is going on in such cases by an appeal to propositions rather than by a reference to 
objects. Namely, Neta recognizes: 
Of course, it could still be that, when we speak of the bloody knife as being 
evidence that the defendant is guilty, what that amounts to is that there is some 
proposition that somehow involves reference to the bloody knife, and that is 
itself evidence that the defendant is guilty.6 
However, according to Neta, there is a problem for the proponent of the 
central function argument for the propositionality of evidence if he endorses this 
kind of explanation. Neta claims: 
But if Williamson is willing to defy grammatical appearances in our account of 
what it is for the bloody knife to be evidence that the defendant is guilty, then 
why should we not be equally willing to defy grammatical appearances when it 
comes to why-explanations? The considerations adduced up to now seem to 
leave it an open question whether the explanantia of our hypotheses are 
propositional, and so whether evidence is propositional.7 
However, these remarks are puzzling. The problem with Neta’s argument is 
that where his opponent has proposed an error theory for cases where we say 
things like “The bloody knife is evidence,” Neta has not proposed an alternative 
explanation of language facts that seam to speak against his proposal (e.g. that 
‘because’ can conjoin only declarative sentences). He has only said that we might 
defy “grammatical appearances when it comes to why-explanation.” One would 
like to know more about this suggestion before endorsing it. Why does it appear to 
us wrongly that only propositions can be the relata of ‘because’? How exactly 
might we defy grammatical appearances in the case of why-explanation? In 
absence of a viable error theory that could reply to such questions, Neta’s 
considerations are ad hoc. Suggesting merely that there might be an error theory 
that would enable us to defy grammatical appearances of why-explanations is not 
enough. Claiming this without a further theoretical motivation is fallacious. 
                                                                
6 Neta, “What Evidence Do You Have?” 96. 
7 Neta, “What Evidence Do You Have?” 96-97. 
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Hence, I conclude that Neta’s argument fails to undermine the argument for the 
propositionality of evidence from the central roles of the ordinary concept of 
evidence.8 
 
                                                                
8 Thanks to Pascal Engel, Robin McKenna, and Tim Williamson for comments and discussion on 
earlier versions of the present note. The research work that lead to this article was supported by 
the Swiss National Science Foundation grant number 148553 (project “Evidence and Epistemic 
Justification”) and grant number 161761 (project “Justification, Lotteries, and Permissibility”).  
